Forcing and the Universe of Sets: Must we lose insight? by Barton, Neil





A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathe-
matics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory.
Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that
there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often forc-
ing constructions that add subsets to models are cited as evidence in favour of
the latter. This paper informs this debate by analysing ways the Universist might
interpret this discourse that seems to necessitate the addition of subsets to V . We
argue that despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist, she
nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse. We
analyse extant interpretations of such talk, and argue that while tradeoffs in nat-
urality have to be made, they are not too severe.
Introduction
Recent discussions of the philosophy of set theory have often focussed on how many
universes of sets there are. The following is a standard position:
Universism. There is a unique, maximal, proper class sized universe
containing all the sets (denoted by ‘V ’).
Universism has often been thought of as the ‘default’ position on the ontology
of sets.1 However, some have seen the existence of many different epistemic pos-
sibilities for the nature of the set-theoretic universe, shown by the large diversity
of model-theoretic constructions witnessing independence (we discuss two of these
methods later) as indicative of the existence of a diversity of different set-theoretic
universes. In this paper, we will be concerned with forcing. This technique has been
undeniably central in the study of independence in set theory, and (prima facie at
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least) adds a set (or—as we shall see—a class) G to a model M to form a forcing
extension extension MrGs.
In broad strokes, the problem arises when we note that set-theoretic practice is
replete with uses of forcing where the symbol ‘V ’ is used to denote the model over
which we force (the so-called ‘ground model’). Since, for non-trivial forcing, the
relevant G added cannot be in the ground model, one might naively think that the
relevant G lives outside V , and so the Universist position is immediately false.
As is well-known, however, there are various interpretative strategies available
to the Universist when it comes to forcing. We discuss these in detail later, but for
now we note that two popular options have been the use of countable transitive
models and Boolean-valued models. In these cases, we re-interpret some or all of
the terms in the forcing construction to yield an interpretation of the forcing talk that
does not commit us to sets outside V . Opponents of Universism sometimes argue
that these interpretations are problematic.2 In this paper, we argue for the following
claims:
(1.) There is some pressure arising from set-theoretic practice to provide an interpre-
tation of forcing where the use of ‘V ’ in a forcing construction is linked to actual
truth in V .
(2.) Nonetheless, the Universist has several options available, and only mild com-
promises have to be made for some of these interpretations.
In this way, we aim to advance and clarify the dialectic between the Universist
and her opponents. In particular we will argue that underpinning (1.) are additional
philosophical commitments to naturality of interpretation, and that these are (2.)
largely satisfied when considering some extant possibilities for interpreting forcing
constructions.
Here’s the plan: After these introductory remarks, we (§1) briefly outline the
kinds of forcing construction we will consider. Next (§2) we will argue that despite
the fact that the Universist has methods for interpreting the forcing required for in-
dependence results, there is nonetheless some pressure to interpret forcing in such a
way that its use is linked to the use of the symbol ‘V ’ in forcing constructions. Specifi-
cally, we will argue that the Universist is able (through the formulation of axioms and
proving of theorems) to learn more about the structure of V by viewing V as situated
in a multiverse framework. We’ll argue then that if the Universist accepts certain
constraints on the naturalness of interpretation of mathematical discourse, there is
additional pressure on her interpretation of forcing. Finally (§3) we provide an anal-
ysis of extant interpretations of forcing found in the literature (the forcing relation,
Boolean-valued models, the Boolean ultrapower, and countable transitive models).
We argue that use of the forcing relation and Boolean-valued models largely violate
the constraints of §2. We will argue that the situation for the Boolean ultrapower and
countable transitive models is more subtle. While there are tradeoffs to be made for
each interpretation, for the countable transitive model strategy these are relatively
minimal, and for a certain class of forcing constructions the Boolean ultrapower is
especially natural (and especially unnatural for a different class). We conclude with
some open questions concerning the directions of debate for both the Universist and
her critics.
2A good example here is [Hamkins, 2012].
2
1 Varieties of forcing
We start with a brief description of forcing constructions to make plain some of their
mathematical properties that will be philosophically relevant later. Forcing comes
in two main kinds; set forcing and class forcing.3 We briefly sketch the constructions
(deferring to the relevant technical literature where appropriate) noting their simi-
larities and differences. The details will be familiar to specialists, but a feel for some
of the properties of the constructions is necessary for seeing the challenges faced.
1.1 Set forcing
For set forcing we begin with a partial order with domain P , ordering ďP, and maxi-
mal element 1P, denoted by ‘P “ xP ,ďP, 1Py’, and have P PM for someZFCmodel4
M. The relevant p P P are known as conditions and effectively operate by providing
partial information about membership of the new object to be defined. We then, via
a careful choice of names (known as ‘P-names’)5, and evaluation procedure6 add a
filter G on P that intersects all dense sets of P in M to M. The end result is a model
MrGs that (i) satisfies ZFC, (ii) has exactly the same ordinal height as M, and (iii) is
strictly larger than M (in the sense that M ĂMrGs).7
Forcing is an especially interesting philosophical construction for a number of
reasons. First, it is historically significant in that it has been used to settle many open
questions (the most famous examples being the independence of CH and AC). Sec-
ond, it is of central importance in virtue of its ubiquity across modern set-theoretic
mathematics; much of set theory concerns constructing one model from another us-
ing forcing arguments. However, especially philosophically interesting is that it keeps
models standard8. Assuming that the ground model M is transitive, well-founded,
and satisfies ZFC, the forcing extension MrGs (i) has the same ordinals as M, (ii)
satisfies ZFC, and (iii) is transitive and well-founded. The fact that forcing keeps
the models standard is significant; generic extensions of a standard model of ZFC
are also ZFC-satisfying cumulative hierarchies.
The issue concerning forcing and V is, of course, that if we wish to perform a
non-trivial forcing where ‘V ’ denotes the Universist’s V as the ground model, the
relevant generic G must lie outside V .9 But V was meant to be all the sets there are,
and so such a G does not exist.
3There is also the related notion of arithmetic forcing used to study models of second-order arithmetic.
Since we are interested primarily in models of set theory here, we set this aside.
4A brief remark is in order here: One does not always force over models of full ZFC, and forcing over
models of weaker theories is well studied. Indeed, in several mathematics texts (such as [Kunen, 2013]),
the ‘official’ approach is to use the reflection theorem to obtain a model of ‘enough’ ZFC to conduct the
independence proof. We defer consideration of this issue until later.
5A P-name is a relation τ such that @xσ, py P τ r“σ is a P-name” ^p P Ps. In other words, τ is
a collection of ordered pairs, where the first element of each pair is a P-name and the second is some
condition in P (the definition is not vacuous in virtue of the empty set trivially being a P-name).
6We evaluate P-names by letting the value of τ under G (written ‘valpτ ,Gq’ or ‘τG’) be
tvalpσ,Gq|Dp P Gpxσ, py P τqu. The valuation operates stepwise by analysing the valuation of all the
names in τ and then either adding them to τG (if there is a p P G and xσ, py P τ ) or discarding them (if
there is no such p P G).
7It should be noted that in order for the forcing to be non-trivial, P has to be non-atomic (i.e. every
p P P has incompatible extensions in P).
8A model M is normally called standard iff it has the real P-relation. See [Kunen, 2013], §IV.2 for verifi-
cation of the basic properties of forcing.
9This is because if G were in V , P´G would be a dense set in V missed by G.
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1.2 Class forcing
Class forcing is very similar to set forcing, except we drop the requirement that the
partial order and generics are members of M and instead permit proper-class-sized
partial orders. The technique also uses partial orders with maximal elements xP,ďP, 1Py,
and adds a generic G to our ground model M. The difference with class forcing is
that P (and hence any associated dense classes andG) can now be proper-class-sized
rather than just set-sized, and so while P Ă M, it is not in general true that P P M,
and G is added as a class (from which it may be possible to construct new sets).
The construction goes through largely the same as set forcing, with a few additional
intricacies and features.10
Class forcing has some interesting properties not enjoyed by standard set forcing.
A good example is that if we allow class forcing over L, then there are reals that we
can add using class forcing that cannot be added by set forcings.11 Further, using
class forcing we can produce models that violate ZFC. For example, the partially
ordered class Colpω,Onq (i.e. functions p from finite subsets of ω into On ordered
by reverse inclusion) is (without further constraints) perfectly legitimate. But if we
force with this poset we obtain a model MrGs that satisfies ZFC as long as G is not
allowed as a class predicate, as the first-order domains of M and MrGs are identi-
cal.12 However, if we admit G as a predicate into the language, Replacement fails.
This is because G codes a cofinal sequence from ω to OnMrGs and there is no set in
MrGs corresponding to OnMrGs.13 This is unlike the case of set forcing where MrGs
is guaranteed to satisfy ZFC if M does. If ZFC preservation is desired14 some care15
is required in defining the relevant P ĎM to be used in forcing.
Class forcing thus introduces two additional challenges not posed by set forcing.
Whilst we must provide an interpretation of any sets that get added, we must also
explain what happens with a forcing that violates ZFC, and also how we should un-
derstand the addition of a class without the addition of any sets that could underpin
the ‘change’ in classes.16
10Details of the presentation given here are available in [Friedman, 2000], Chapter 2. When performing
a class forcing, we generally force over models of the form LpAq “ ŤtLpA X Vαq|α P Onu. Any model
pM ,Aq of ZF (where we include Replacement for formulas mentioning A) can be changed to a model of
this form by expanding it to a model pM ,A˚qwhere A˚ “ tx0,xy|x P Au Y tx1,VMα y|α P OnM u.
11This is a deep result of Jensen, see [Friedman, 2010], p. 559 for details.
12To see this, note that for any P-name σ for this poset and for each condition p in the in-
tersection of the transitive closure of σ with P, ranppq Ď rankpσq. We then define the dense
set D “ tp P P|rankpσq P ranppqu. D is then both dense and definable over M. Letting
σp “ tτp|Dq P Prτ , q P σ ^ p ďP qsu. We then have σp “ σG P M whenever G is P-generic over
M and p P DXG, because p either extends or is incompatible with any condition in the transitive closure
of σ. Hence, whenever G is P-generic over M, they contain exactly the same first-order objects.
13For details, see [Holy et al., 2016].
14We shall argue later that for the purposes of talking about forcings over V , there is no reason why
ZFC preservation is especially desirable.
15The relevant conditions are pretameness and tameness of the partial order, corresponding respectively
to preservation of Replacement and Power Set. See [Friedman, 2000] for details.
16A delicate issue here is exactly what theory our starting universe satisfies when performing a class
forcing. [Friedman, 2000] is a thorough presentation, and studies class forcing over structures of the
form pM ,Aq, where A is first-order definable with parameters. However, we might also try to force over
models of full Morse-Kelley class theory, see [Antos and Friedman, F] for discussion. Since our arguments
here do not depend on the use of non-definable classes and, as it stands, the definable class presentation
is more usual, we restrict our attention to constructions defined within this latter approach (though our
arguments could easily be transferred to theMK case).
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2 Looking at V through the Multiversist lens
We thus have two kinds of construction that seem to add external entities to models,
and the datum that often set theorists use the terms ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ when performing
a forcing construction. However, more must be done philosophically to create a
genuine problem here. For example, why (given the Universist’s ‘predicament) can’t
she just insist that the use of the terms ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ should not be understood
literally, or that forcing is simply not a legitimate construction? In this section we’ll
provide some support to the idea that there is a genuine problem to be dealt with
here, and one way of motivating this problem is via constraints on the naturality of
interpretation.
We will simply take it as read that the Universist should not outright reject forcing
as a legitimate mathematical technique. Forcing is an essential part of the working
set theorist’s toolkit, and clearly represents a coherent body of study. We are also
moved by the more open-ended desire to provide the Universist’s opponent with the
tools she requires to construct her objection, rather than just rejecting the grounds for
the question outright.
However, the idea that we should re-interpret the problematic terms is pertinent,
and indeed the extent to which such a strategy can be carried out satisfactorily forms
the focus of this paper. For now, we simply note that the Universist can provide in-
terpretations of forcing that are non-vacuous. We discuss these approaches in detail
§3, but two standard approaches are either to regard forcing statements as a fac¸on
de parler for speaking about Boolean-valued models or as concerned with countable
transitive models of (a fragment of) ZFC.17 Each method of interpretation, however,
yields a model that does not commit the Universist to sets outside V .18 This is perti-
nent, since one important use of forcing constructions has been to show independence
results. Specifically, given a statement φ (such as the continuum hypothesis) we use
forcing to construct a model of (a fragment of) ZFC` φ, thereby showing that φ is
not a consequence of (a fragment of) ZFC (or some extension thereof). If all we wish
to do is show essentially number-theoretic facts about relative provability, then there
is little pressure to accept that forcing requires anything more than a non-vacuous
interpretation; all we need to do is show that there is some model or other that can
serve as the interpretation of the forcing language and as a counterexample to the
claim that ZFC $ φ, and the Universist can already do this.
In order for the existence of forcing to provide evidence against the Universist
then, more needs to be said. In the rest of this section we will develop this problem.
We will argue for the following claims:
17Indeed, this is the strategy of many set theory textbooks. For example the Boolean-valued model
strategy is put forward by [Jech, 2002]:
“As the properties of the generic extension can be described entirely withing the ground
model, statements about V rGs can be understood as statements in the ground model using
the language of forcing.” ([Jech, 2002], p. 201)
Whereas the countable transitive model strategy is the main strategy pursued in [Kunen, 2013] (see Ch.
4 §5).
18Koellner, for example, is sensitive to this point:
“The advocate of the universe view is unmoved by these considerations [arising from forc-
ing] since the models produced are not candidates for the universe of sets, the first because
it is an object within the universe of sets, the second because it is a description of a class-size
structure which is not even of the relevant type. The mere existence of the model-theory
of forcing (something that is uncontroversially accepted by both parties) is not sufficient to
secure the multiverse conception. Something more needs to be said.” ([Koellner, 2013], pp.
18–19)
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(i) Forcing is more than just a tool for proving number-theoretic consistency facts,
it is also useful for formulating axioms and proving theorems about large in-
finitary objects in V .
(ii) Given an acceptance of the claim that providing a ‘natural’ or ‘transparent’ in-
terpretation of mathematical discourse is desirable, the Universist has addi-
tional constraints on her interpretation of forcing.
2.1 Proving theorems and formulating axioms
How is forcing useful for more than proving number-theoretic facts? As we’ll see,
forcing over V can be used in analysing the structure of large infinitary objects out-
side the domain of number theory. This is both with respect to proving theorems
from within ZFC, but also for formulating axioms that go beyond ZFC (and prov-
ing theorems on their basis). As we’ll discuss below, this puts some pressure on the
claim that we might want more than just any old interpretation of the mathematics—
since viewing V as though it were part of a multiversist framework facilitates insight
concerning V , we might desire an interpretation of this talk that respects as much in-
tuitive content of the mathematics as possible. Before we provide this philosophical
analysis though, we provide a brief description of the mathematical landscape to
show the importance of this way of thinking.
Proving theorems
Within ZFC, there are a wide number of questions concerning V that can be settled
on the basis of considering forcing extensions. The rough strategy of such theorems
is to show that if V has a forcing extension such that φ (for some particular φ) then
some other sentence ψ holds of V (say by using absoluteness facts). For example:19
Theorem 1. [Baumgartner and Hajnal, 1973] ω1 ÝÑ pαq2n for all finite n and count-
able α (i.e. For all finite n and countable α, every partition of the two-element subsets
of ω1 into a finite number of pieces has a homogeneous20 set of order-type α).
The proof proceeds by finding a homogeneous set in a forcing extension where
MA holds. This establishes that a certain tree from the ground model is non-well-
founded in the extension. We then know, by the absoluteness of well-foundedness,
that the tree is also non-well-founded in the ground model, establishing the theorem.
The theorem is broadly illustrative of how one can use the perspective of exten-
sions to prove facts about the ground model. One moves to an extension where
one has ensured the existence of objects of a certain desirable kind, used these to
reason about objects in the ground model, and then inferred via absoluteness facts
(e.g. Le´vy-Shoenfield absoluteness) that the ground model must in fact have the rele-
vant properties. Importantly here, theorems like the above are not straightforwardly
about number theory and the possibility of proof, but rather concern genuine infini-
tary objects in the ground model.
A compendium of similar theorems is available in [Todorc˘evic´ and Farah, 1995].
One further clear example bears mentioning here though. Since the formulation
of CH (and realisation that it is independent from ZFC) set theorists have studied
so-called cardinal characteristics; the study of uncountable infinite sets that may or
19I am grateful to [name removed for blind review] for pointing out this example.
20Here, a homogeneous set is a subset X of ω1 such that every 2-element subset of X is in the same
member of the partition.
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may not be smaller than the continuum. The relationships of these infinite cardinals
are well studied21, but recently [Malliaris and Shelah, 2016] showed that two such
characteristics (namely p and t) that were previously thought to be likely separable
in certain models were in fact equal. The proof is rather involved22, but depends
crucially on supposing for contradiction that p ă t in V , and then tracing out some
consequences of this assumption (and finding a contradiction) in a forcing extension
V rGs. Thus, situating V within a Forcing Multiversist framework allows us to solve
important23 and difficult set-theoretic questions on the basis of how V behaves with
respect to its forcing extensions.
Thus, forcing extensions can function with respect to V in contemporary set the-
ory somewhat like the historical situation with complex and real numbers. For sev-
eral years, before the advent of interpretation of the complex numbers in the Eu-
clidean plane, mathematicians were still using the algebraic properties of complex
numbers to prove results about the reals with great success.24 Similarly, extensions
of V can be used to determine properties of V . It is the external perspective provided
by the forcing extension that can facilitate a greater understanding of the ground
model. The Universist then, might feel some pressure to interpret forcing over V—
by looking at V from V rGs, she is able to see more.
Formulating axioms
The same is true also for theories extending ZFC. Especially interesting here is that
forcing becomes a useful tool not just for proving theorems, but also formulating axioms.
As we explain below, the flexibility afforded by extensions often provides us with
additional resources for expressing axioms with interesting properties.
One way of asserting the existence of large cardinals (often quite strong), is through
the use of elementary embeddings. The cardinals measurable, strong, supercompact
(among others) are all naturally defined by positing the existence of elementary em-
beddings from V into transitive inner models. These represent strong axioms, push-
ing us (unlike smaller large cardinals) well beyond V “ L. When defining a large
cardinal through an embedding j : N ÝÑM, the strength of the embedding depends
mainly on two parameters:
(i) The size of N and M.
(ii) Where j sends the ordinals.
For instance, the minimal case for an embedding between proper class models;
namely the existence of a non-trivial j : L ÝÑ L suffices to define the principle
that “07 exists”. If we assume that dompjq “ V , we strengthen to the level of a
measurable cardinal. We know that the existence of a non-trivial j : V ÝÑ V is
21Chichon´’s diagram, for example, is a manifestation of the detailed knowledge we now have concern-
ing how some of these characteristics behave in models of ZFC.
22I thank [name removed for blind review] for patient explanation here.
23For instance, the result (unlike much of set theory) attracted some interest from the wider mathemat-
ical community, being the subject of a piece in Quanta magazine and receiving some attention from Tim
Gowers.
24See, for example the remarks in [Painleve´, 1900] concerning real and complex analysis:
“The natural development of this work soon led the geometers in their studies to embrace
imaginary as well as real values of the variable. The theory of Taylor series, that of elliptic
functions, the vast field of Cauchy analysis, caused a burst of productivity derived from this
generalization. It came to appear that, between two truths of the real domain, the easiest
and shortest path quite often passes through the complex domain.”
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inconsistent (moduloZF) withAC.25 Despite this we can study intermediate cardinals
by modifying the properties of j and M. For example, we can use the following pair
of definitions to strengthen the notion of measurable along the dimensions of (i) and
(ii):
Definition 2. A cardinal κ is λ-supercompact iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial
elementary embeddings j : V ÝÑ M, such that jpκq ą λ and λM Ď M (i.e. M is
closed under λ-sequences).
Definition 3. A cardinal κ is supercompact iff it is λ-supercompact for all λ P On.
The definition of supercompact uses the dimensions of (i) and (ii) to increase the
strength of the embedding. We postulate a higher degree of similarity between V
and M (in terms of closure under λ-sequences for the relevant λ), and stipulate that
j sends κ above λ.
Standard discussions of middling large cardinals proceed from this template.
However, we can generalise the construction to generic embeddings. Given a forcing
construction adding a generic G over a model N, a generic embedding is of the form
j : N ÝÑM Ď NrGs. In other words, we begin to study embeddings from structures
to inner models of their forcing extensions.
Recently, there has been an increased focus on such embeddings. Indeed, the
study of generic embeddings has become widespread, as Foreman (in a Hanbook of
Set Theory article on generic embeddings) illustrates:26
“The main aim of the chapter is to illustrate that there is a coherent the-
ory here, that there are unifying fundamental ideas that occur frequently
in many different contexts. These include master condition ideals, nat-
ural and induced ideals, disjointing, self-genericity, the role of diagonal
unions for representing Boolean sums, good elementary substructures—
the list is long.” ([Foreman, 2010], p890)
Generic embeddings are thus useful for studying certain natural mathematical
properties. Furthermore, the involvement of extensions in the consideration of em-
beddings provides an additional dimension in which we may vary the nature of the
construction. Not only does the embedding depend upon the size of the domain
and range of the embedding and where the ordinals are sent, but also on a third
parameter:
(iii) The nature of the forcing required to define j.27
The fact that we have an extra dimension in which we can vary the structure of
these kinds of embeddings makes them an intriguing subject matter. However, even
more interesting is that the critical points of these axioms can be rather small. For
example, we have:
Theorem 4. If I is an ω2-saturated ideal on ω1 and U is generic for the poset of I-
positive sets, then in V rU s the ultrapower UltpV ,Uq is well-founded and we get a
map j : V ÝÑM Ď V rU swith critpjq “ ω1 and jpω1q “ ω2.
25See [Kunen, 1971] for the result, and [Schindler, 2014] for a recent presentation.
26See also, [Foreman, 1986] for several key results, and [Foreman, 1998] for a more informal overview.
27For further exposition of this line of thinking, see [Foreman, 1998] and [Foreman, 2010].
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Such an embedding from V to another model M has ω1 as its critical point, far
below the size of a measurable cardinal.28 Despite the smallness of the critical points,
however, these embeddings have a significant amount of large cardinal strength.29
Thus, these embeddings provide significant combinatorial power whilst facilitating
proof concerning small uncountable sets.30
Moreover, it is not just through postulating the existence of embeddings directly
between V and models within forcing extensions that allow us to formulate new
axioms with significant large cardinal strength. Through analysing properties of
ordinals in extensions, we can come to characterisations of new varieties of cardinal.
An example of Schindler is especially pertinent here:
Definition 5. [Schindler, 2000] A cardinal κ is remarkable iff in the Colpω,ăκq forcing
extension V rGs, for every regular λ ą κ there is a cardinal λ0 ă κ, λ0 regular in V ,
and j : HVλ0 ÝÑ HVλ such that critpjq “ γ and jpγq “ κ.
We are able to characterise the notion of a cardinal being remarkable if, when we
collapse all cardinals less than κ to ω through forcing, in this Colpω,ăκq extension
V rGs, for every regular λ ą κ in V rGs there is a V -regular cardinal λ0 ă κ such that
the heriditarily λ0-sized sets elementarily embed into the hereditarily λ-sized sets.
Thus, by studying how sets are embeddable in the extension, we are able to ascribe
large cardinal properties to ordinals in V . The consistency strength of a remarkable
cardinal for instance, while not strong enough to push us outside V “ L, is substan-
tially stronger than a weakly compact cardinal31. The problem here is that we are
predicating a large cardinal property of κ, an object in V , but using resources from
extensions to define what it is to have said large cardinal property.
The case of class forcing is somewhat trickier, since it has received less attention
than set forcing. However, some uses have been found in the literature; for example
certain generic embeddings can be defined using class-sized stationary tower forcing
(on the assumption that V satisfies large cardinal properties).32
Moreover, one can show that class forcing facilitates the formalisation of different
axioms that go beyond what can be captured by set forcing.
A good example here is:
28We know, for instance, that |ω1| ď |Ppωq|, making it accessible. To get an idea of the scale of the
difference, if κ is measurable then it has to be an inaccessible limit of inaccessible cardinals.
29For example, the existence of both a saturated ideal on ω1 (and associated generic embedding) and a
measurable cardinal implies the existence of an inner model with a Woodin cardinal, whereas the consis-
tency strength of a measurable cardinal is far below that of a single Woodin. See [Steel, 1996] for details.
30Foreman, for example, writes concerning generic embeddings:
“The advantage of allowing the embeddings to be generic is that the critical points of the
embeddings can be quite small, even as small as ω1. For this reason they have many
consequences for accessible cardinals, settling many classical questions of set theory.”
([Foreman, 2010], p887)
.
31Weakly compact cardinals are so named in virtue of being characterisable through compactness prop-
erties on infinitary languages. They admit of a diverse number of equivalent characterisations. For details,
see [Kanamori, 2009].
32The following example is taken from [Larson, 2004], §2.3, p. 59. Suppose that V contains a proper
class of completely Jo´nsson cardinals. Letting P8 be the class tower forcing, and G Ă P8 be V -generic,
and V rGs be:
V rGs “ ď
αPOrd
LpVα,GX Vαq
there exists a generic embedding j : V ÝÑ V rGs such that for every a P P8, a P G iff jrYas P jpaq. I
thank [name removed for blind review] for bringing this example to my attention.
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Axiom 6. The Inner Model Hypothesis. Let φ be a parameter-free first-order sentence.
If φ is true in an inner model of an outer model of V , then φ is already true in an
inner model of V .
The Inner Model Hypothesis, as proposed by [Friedman, 2006], is meant to apply
to arbitrary extensions of V and raises difficult questions for how it might be coded.33
However, note that it admits restricted forms (again, let φ be parameter free):
Axiom 7. The Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. If φ is true in an inner model of a
set-generic forcing extension V rGs of V , then φ is already true in an inner model of
V .
This admits of a natural generalisation:
Axiom 8. The Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. If φ is true in an inner model of
a class-generic forcing extension V rGs of V , then φ is already true in an inner model
of V .
Let us assume that a satisfactory coding mechanism for set forcings over V is
available. If the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is true (since we are interested
in what is possible for a Universist, we will say little about its motivation here34) we
get some consequences:
Fact 9. If the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is true, then V ­“ L.35
However, though the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is sufficient to get us
a certain richness of inner models (enough to break V “ L) we get more if we allow
class forcings. This is brought out in the following:
Fact 10. There is a model satisfying the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis that
does not satisfy the Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis.36
It thus seems that class forcing is able to aid in the facilitation of formulating
axioms that substantially go beyond those that are formalisable using set forcings.
Again, since our current topic is to see ways in which the Universist might (rather
than must) lose insight, we will simply take it as given from this point on that class
forcings provide a tool for proving theorems and formulating axioms concerning V .
33See [Antos et al., S] for discussion.
34One way of motivating these sorts of axioms is as absoluteness principles. Effectively, they say that V
already has witnesses for ways things ‘could’ be (in the sense of possibility in coded extensions).
35
Proof. Assume V “ L and that the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is true. Then there is an inner
model of an outer model in which V “ L is false (the addition of a single Cohen real x over L to Lrxswill
suffice, with the relevant inner model simply being the forcing extension Lrxs). By the Set-Generic Inner
Model Hypothesis there is an inner model of L in which V ­“ L. But L is the smallest inner model, and
so V “ L and V ­“ L, K.
36I am grateful to [name removed for blind review] for discussion of the following:
Proof. Let M be a model of V “ L containing a reflecting cardinal κ. (In the present context, κ is a
reflecting cardinal iff (i) κ is regular, and (ii) whenever φ is a sentence with parameters from Vκ, if φ holds
in some Vα (in V ), then φ holds in some Vβ with β ă κ. The definition is equivalent to saying that κ is
regular and Vκ is Σ2 elementary in V . In terms of consistency strength, it is stronger than inaccessible
but weaker than Mahlo.) Next, perform the Le´vy Collapse to move κ to ω1. By the absorption properties
attaching to the Le´vy Collapse (see here [Cummings, 2010], §14) the extension LrGs then satisfies the Set-
Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. However, by [Jensen, 1972] one can define class-generic reals that are
not set-generic. LetH be a generic yielding such a real in an extension LrHs. We then note that LrGs does
not have an inner model with a real that is not set-generic over L, and so the Class-Generic Inner Model
Hypothesis fails in LrGs.
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2.2 The Naturalness Constraints
Above, we saw how situating V in a multiverse of universes obtained by forcing
facilitates the proving of theorems and formulation of axioms beyond the merely
number-theoretic. However, we also noted that the Universist could at least inter-
pret this talk non-vacuously. How might we then combine the observation that forc-
ing is more than a tool for proving independence into a genuine problem for the
Universist?
The key notion will be the naturalness of interpretation provided. As we have
just argued, the proving of theorems and formulation of axioms in the present con-
text relates to more than the mere existence of models to required to prove relative
consistency proofs. Forcing allows us to prove that certain uncountable cardinals
are in fact equal (e.g. p “ t), posit the existence of and study large cardinals (e.g.
remarkable cardinals), and formulate axioms with consequences for the existence of
real numbers and accessible cardinals (e.g. generic embeddings and variants of the
inner model hypothesis).
We might then press the following idea: It is not enough to merely give some
model or other in providing an interpretation of forcing. Since it seems that set-
theorists can use extensions of V to reason about V , and that when performing this
reasoning the relevant extensions appear to be bona-fide universes of set, we should
want whatever interpretation we prescribe to be as faithful as possible to the set
theorist’s intuitive thinking. Perhaps under such constraints the Universist’s inter-
pretations will come out as deficient?
There are two immediate challenges to this line of attack:
(1.) The notion of what counts as a ‘natural’ or ‘faithful’ interpretation is imprecise.
(2.) It is unclear why the Universist cannot just reject this requirement on naturalness
outright.
Both challenges can be answered, at least partially. Regarding (1.): While it is
true to say that what the notion of being a ‘natural’, ‘faithful’, or ‘semantically trans-
parent’ interpretation comes down to is going to be a difficult question to answer (in
the sense of providing necessary and sufficient conditions) this does not mean that
we have zero grip on the notion. In fact, the following all seem to be legitimate and
precise constraints on ways in which an interpretation can be more or less natural:
(1.) (The Facetious Constraint.) The interpretation of ‘V ’ could refer to V , G to an
actual generic outside V , and V rGs to a literal extension of V .
(2.) The interpretation of ‘V ’ in the construction could be V itself.
(3.) More minimally, the interpretation of ‘V ’ in the construction could satisfy the
same first-order sentences as V .
(4.) One or both of the interpretations of ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ could be well-founded, and
hence admit of an absolute notion of being formed through transfinite iteration
of a powerset-like operation.
(5.) The interpretations of ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ could contain uncountable sets.
(6.) Each of ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ could contain all the ordinals.
(7.) The structures denoted by each of ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ could be two-valued.
11
(8.) The movement between the interpretation of ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ could be ‘transpar-
ent’, in the sense that whatever is denoted by ‘V rGs’ really is obtainable by the
usual forcing idea of the addition of a generic to whatever is denoted by ‘V ’.
(9.) Steps in proofs that use forcing constructions could be interpreted with the min-
imal amount of change, so additional or different steps do not need to be made
to keep the proof in line with the interpretation.
We will refer to the project of trying to satisfy as many of the above desiderata as
possible as satisfying the Naturalness Constraints. While we certainly do not contend
that the list is complete, we think that the ease of providing such a preliminary list
shows that we have some grip on the notion of what counts as more or less natural as
an interpretation. The Facetious Constraint is so-named because it obviously cannot
be satisfied by the Universist, but as we shall see shortly is helpful in clarifying the
dialectic.
Regarding (2.): The question of whether or not the Universist should accept the
Naturalness Constraints to any degree is going to be a difficult one. However, some
points can be made in the favour of acceptance.
First, we might accept the Naturalness Constraints just for the sake of examining
the opponents challenge on the strongest grounds possible. If the Universist can
provide an interpretation that respects as many of the Naturalness Constraints as
possible, this represents a more robust conclusion and so is philosophically desirable
anyway.
Second, responding to the Naturalness Constraints is particularly dialectically ef-
fective given that some opponents to Universism seem to subscribe to similar ideas.
Consider the following passages from Hamkins (an ardent anti-Universist):
“This abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious difficulty
for the universe view, for if one holds that there is a single absolute back-
ground concept of set, then one must explain or explain away as imagi-
nary all of the alternative universes that set theorists seem to have con-
structed. This seems a difficult task, for we have a robust experience in
those worlds, and they appear fully set theoretic to us. The multiverse
view, in contrast, explains this experience by embracing them as real, fill-
ing out the vision hinted at in our mathematical experience, that there is
an abundance of set-theoretic worlds into which our mathematical tools
have allowed us to glimpse.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p. 418)
and
“...a set theorist with the universe view can insist on an absolute back-
ground universe V , regarding all forcing extensions and other models
as curious complex simulations within it. (I have personally witnessed
the necessary contortions for class forcing.) Such a perspective may be
entirely self-consistent, and I am not arguing that the universe view is
incoherent, but rather, my point is that if one regards all outer models of
the universe as merely simulated inside it via complex formalisms, one
may miss out on insights that could arise from the simpler philosophical
attitude taking them as fully real.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p. 426)
Part of Hamkins’ point, it seems, is that while he acknowledges that the Uni-
versist can interpret forcing constructions, the interpretation provided is some how
unnatural requiring “contortions” and not respecting the “mathematical experience”.
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Better instead (he argues) to take a forcing multiversist position on which extensions
are uncontroversially and easily available (indeed, the forcing multiversist immedi-
ately satisfies the Facetious Constraint). If the Universist can provide a response that
satisfies as many of the Naturalness Constraints as possible, she would thus provide
the strongest possible response to criticisms in the style of Hamkins.
Thirdly, the Naturalness Constraints chime well with things the Universist might
be tempted to say anyway. A standard (but by no means the only) response one often
receives when asking why one might hold the Universist picture is that it seems,
given the iterative conception of set, that one is defining a unique structure. One
simply iterates the powerset operation through the ordinals, thereby specifying V .
Now, while the significance or effectiveness of such an argument is highly debatable,
it nonetheless bears mentioning that the line of thinking relies on something like
the Naturalness Constraints: It certainly seems as though we talk about a unique
structure when we begin to study set theory through the iterative conception, and so
the most natural interpretation (the Universist might argue) is that we do so. (Note
that this remark (and the current debate) would apply equally well to theorists who
do not hold that the universe has a definite height, but are nonetheless tempted by
the idea that the powerset operation is definite.)
We thus believe that the Universist has at least some reason to try and provide an
interpretation of forcing that respects the Naturalness Constraints. From now on we
shall simply take it as an assumption that she would like to satisfy as much of the
Naturalness Constraints as possible, whilst acknowledging that this is an area that
merits further analysis.
As we shall see, extant interpretations of forcing constructions reveal that the
Universist can satisfy a good deal of the Naturalness Constraints, although the vari-
ous interpretations behave differently. First, however, let’s examine a quick example
to see how the Naturalness Constraints might exclude certain interpretations as fully
satisfactory. Both remarkable cardinals and generic embeddings in fact admit of for-
mulations internal to V , without mentioning forcing at all. Remarkable cardinals, for
example, can be formulated in terms of embeddings between countable models and
certain sets of particular hereditary cardinalities.37 Generic embeddings can like-
wise be formulated by an internal to V condition, usually in terms of the existence
of particular ideals.38 One might then just regard the formulation of remarkable car-
dinals and generic embeddings as a fac¸on de parler for ascribing these internal-to-V
properties to certain objects.
Given the Naturalness Constraints, this strategy seems to perform relatively poorly.
In particular, whilst there is no denying the mathematical interest of these equivalent
37See here [Schindler, 2001].
38Some remarks of Foreman are pertinent here:
“The language of ideals, together with the mechanics of forcing provide the same kind of
vehicle for stating generalized large cardinal axioms in the language of set theory. Assum-
ing the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals, Burke’s Proposition...shows that
every countably complete ideal is pre-precipitous. More directly: the existence of an ele-
mentary embedding j : V ÝÑ M Ď V rGs where G Ď P is generic and j”λ P M is easily
seen to be equivalent to the existence of a P-term for an ultrafilter 9U Ď PpPpλqqV is normal
for regressive functions in V and fine and is such that there is no descending ω-sequence of
U -equivalence classes of functions from V . The idea of an induced ideal allows us to restate
this combinatorially as a normal, fine, precipitous ideal I on Ppλq such that the quotient
algebra PpPpλqq{I inherits some of the properties of the original partial ordering P. Fi-
nally, moving along the “F” axis [the nature of forcing required to define j] in the direction
of greater strength, the saturation properties of ideals play exactly the same role for gener-
alized large cardinals as ultrafilters do for conventional large cardinals.” ([Foreman, 2010],
p1128)
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characterisations, as an interpretation of the relevant forcing discourse there is no ac-
tual interpretation given to the forcing itself, no model similar to V is extended, and
there is no actual forcing occurring at all. In this way, the interpretation does not seem
very natural; part of the insight gained from having these axioms is facilitating the
study of objects of V ‘as if’ they were situated in a forcing multiversist framework.
Often the most natural context in which to define and study them (and the relevant
associated objects internal to V ) is the forcing perspective. An interpretation of forc-
ing which can make use of this perspective thus gains more insight than one which
cannot.
3 Available interpretations
Thus far we’ve argued that (1.) The Universist has reason to want to interpret forc-
ing talk over V (in order to study the objects of V ) and (2.) Taking the Universist’s
opponent’s complaints seriously depends on holding that some degree of ‘natural-
ness in interpretation’ is desirable. We will now analyse ways that we might code
talk concerning forcing extensions, and see how they perform with respect to the
Naturalness Constraints. We’ll argue that different interpretations sacrifice different
aspects of the Constraints, but that some are more serious than others. In the end
we’ll see that the so-called Boolean ultrapower map is especially natural for a certain
class of forcings, and the countable transitive model strategy provides a method that
satisfies many of the Naturalness Constraints across the board.
3.1 The forcing relation
We begin with a discussion of how we might try to capture claims concerning forc-
ing extensions syntactically by defining a relation that captures the consequences of
extensions without actually committing to the existence of any models. For forc-
ing, this can be done by defining a so-called forcing relation. Roughly put, letting
P “ xP ,ďPy be a forcing poset, p P P , and φ be in the forcing language for P,39, we
can define a relation p P˚ recursively.40 One can then verify:
(1) If φ1, ...,φn $ ψ and p P˚ φi for each i, then p P˚ ψ.
(2) p P˚ φ for every axiom of ZFC.
(3) If φpx1, ...,xnq is a formula known to be absolute for transitive models, then for
every p and all sets a1, ..an; p P˚ φpaˇ1, ..., aˇnq iff 1P P˚ φpaˇ1, ..., aˇnq iff φpa1, ..., anq
is true in V .
Essentially, P˚ lets us talk about what would be satisfied in the extension V rGs
by analysing what sentences conditions p P P force. In particular, if we can show
that there is a p P P such that p P˚ φ, we can behave and talk as if such a forcing
extension exists. By (3), any theorem proved ‘in V rGs’ will be verified by the check
names and hence by specific sets in V . Similarly, if we wish to formulate an axiom
about V using a forcing extension, we can do so by finding a p that forces the required
sentence about objects in the ideal extension.
The use of the forcing relation is absolutely fine for relative consistency proofs.
We know that if we can find a p P P such that p P˚ φ, then we cannot prove  φ
39The forcing language of P is the collection of all formulas that can be formed by the usual logical
operators from the languageLP combined with a constant symbol for every name in V P (the P-names).
40See [Kunen, 2013] for details of the forcing relation and verification of the relevant proofs.
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(assuming the consistency of ZFC). There are, however, several problems with this
approach to interpreting forcing talk.
First, there is a problem of scope. The difficulty lies in the fact that the forcing
relation need not be definable when the forcing poset in question is proper-class-sized.
For example, consider the following forcing:
Definition 11. Let M be a model for ZFC. Then the Friedman poset (denoted by
‘FM’) is a partial order of conditions p “ xdp, ep, fpy such that:
(i) dp is a finite subset of ω.
(ii) ep is a binary acyclic relation relation on dp.
(iii) fp is an injective function with dompfpq P tH, dpu and ranpfpq ĎM.
(iv) If dompfpq “ dp and i, j P dp, then iepj iff fppiq P fppjq.
(v) The ordering on FM is given by:
p ďFM q Ø dq Ď dp ^ ep X pdq ˆ dqq “ eq ^ fq Ď fp.
This defines a proper-class-sized partial order as the individual fp include every
function from some finite subset of ω to a (sub)set of M, and hence there are proper-
class-many such ordered triples (relative to M). The partial order adds a bijection
FF between ω and M , and a relation EF P MrGs such that xω,EFy and xM , Py are
isomorphic. If the forcing relation for F were definable, M would then have access
to its own truth definition (contradicting Tarski’s Theorem).41
Thus we have:
Theorem 12. [Holy et al., 2016] (attributed to Friedman) F˚ is not uniformly defin-
able for F.
Hence, there are forcings for which there is no definition of the forcing relation
in the ground model. This is true, despite the fact that FM itself is definable over
M. If we wish to use FV in proving facts about V then, we cannot do so through
consideration of a forcing relation in V . Since well-behaved forcings (so called ‘tame’
and ‘pretame’ class forcings)42 have definable forcing relations, we know that any
extension using F must violate ZFC.43 One may feel that this provides a response:
we should not consider such forcing arguments as legitimate for proving facts about
V because the resulting ‘model’ we are trying to talk about is pathological—it is
non-ZFC-preserving.
We hold that the Universist should have little truck with such a claim. It is true
that the resulting extensions are pathological in violating ZFC. However, we should
note that (from the Universist’s perspective) the whole enterprise with which we are
engaged (namely considering extensions of V ) is somewhat pathological: such sets
cannot literally exist. We are rather trying to code in V the effects of viewing V as
part of a forcing multiversist framework despite the fact that the relevant extensions
do not exist (strictly speaking). Thus, there seems to be no objection to considering
models where, say, there is a bijection between ω and V (as is the case when forcing
41For the details of the proof, and further discussion of the Truth and Definability lemmas in context of
class forcing, see [Holy et al., 2016].
42Pretameness implies the preservation of Replacement in a class forcing, and tameness additionally
requires that the forcing preserve the Power Set Axiom. For details, see [Friedman, 2000].
43See [Holy et al., 2016].
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using FV ). If consideration of such ‘pathologies’ has interesting consequences (such
as the study of how truth predicates might behave) within V then there seems little
reason to prohibit their examination.
One might simply postulate that a definition can be given for FV and other class-
sized partial orders with non-first-order definable forcing relations. Such definitions
could not be first-order, but interestingly such a hypothesis fits naturally in the space
of second-order set theories between NBG and MK. [Gitman et al., 2017] showed
that the hypothesis that every class partial order has a forcing relation is equivalent
to the principle that transfinite recursions of class relations for ordinal length are
legitimate (so called ‘ETROrd’). Whether this issue of scope can be assuaged thus
depends precisely on one’s attitude to second-order class theory. Presumably the
Universist who wishes to try and interpret class forcing over V has some sympathy
with the use of second-order resources (since the classes added are often non-first-
order definable), and so we set the problem of scope aside.
Irregardless, the use ofP˚ fares reasonably poorly with respect to the Naturalness
Constraints. For many cases of forcing, reasoning syntactically about the forcing re-
lation does not accord with the phenomenological character of the set theorist’s rea-
soning. They wish to reason about sets which can be combinatorially manipulated,
embeddings which move ordinals, and so forth. Thus, while ‘V ’ is able to denote V
in this interpretation of forcing, there are no models involved (two-valued or other-
wise), there is no actual forcing occurring, and no model which is actually extended.
This issue is brought out clearly when we consider generic embeddings. These pro-
vide us with quintessentially combinatorial kinds of reasoning; we want to see what
ordinals are moved by j (and where) and what the structure of the remaining sets
looks like given the existence of j. Here, however, the reasoning is fully syntactic; we
analyse which formulas particular p P P force, and so are explicitly not working with
sets in the above manner. In this way, the use of the forcing relation, though both
useful and of mathematical interest, leaves some philosophical issues untouched.
3.2 Boolean-valued models
Next, we consider the use of Boolean-valued models.44 Starting with a forcing poset
P, we can find a separative45 partial order Q, equivalent to P for forcing, and a
(unique up to isomorphism) Boolean completion of Q (denoted by ‘BpQq’).46,47 We then
consider the class of BpPq-names (denoted by ‘V BpPq’), assign values from BpPq to
atomic relations between them, and provide an inductive definition for the quanti-
fiers.48
It is then routine to show that V BpPq is a Boolean-valued model of ZFC. In par-
ticular every axiom (and hence every theorem) of ZFC has Boolean-value 1BpPq in
V BpPq. Moreover, for the purposes of consistency proofs, we know that if we can
assign φ a Boolean-value greater than 0BpPq, then  φ is not a consequence of ZFC
(as if  φ is a consequence of ZFC, then φ receives Boolean value 0BpPq). In fact, an
44The Boolean-valued approach was developed by Scott and Solovay, with additional contributions by
Vopeˇnka (among others). See [Smullyan and Fitting, 1996], p. 273 for historical details and references.
45A partial order P “ pP ,ăPq is separative iff for all p, q P P , if p P q then there exists an r ďP p that
is incompatible with q.
46For details of Boolean algebras (from which our presentation is derived) see [Jech, 2002], Chapter 7.
A discussion of Boolean completions is available in ibid. Chapter 14.
47We will (mildly) abuse notation and use BpPq to refer to the relevant Boolean completion even when
P is not separative (i.e. the Boolean completion obtained from a separative partial order Q, such that Q is
equivalent to P for forcing).
48See here, [Jech, 2002], Ch. 14.
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assignment of a Boolean value greater than 0BpPq to φ exactly mimics the satisfaction
of φ in some V rGs, for V -generic G.
Thus, by discussing the Boolean-valued model V BpPq, we are able to capture the
intra-V content of talking about set forcing extensions of V . For example, suppose
that we wish to show that the satisfaction of φ in a set forcing extension byG Ď P P V
has consequence ψ within V . We can then take the Boolean completion BpPq, and
show that we can assign φ Boolean-value greater than 0BpPq in V BpPq. By tracing the
Boolean-values back to V , we then know that V satisfies ψ.
There are several problems with the use of Boolean-valued models, however. It
has two particular limitations when it comes to forcing, despite its ability to capture
satisfaction in forcing extensions.
The first is again a problem of scope. It is unclear how to interpret class forcing
on the present approach. For, in class forcing, the relevant partial order P is proper-
class-sized, and hence unbounded in the Vα. When defining the Boolean completion
BpPq we then encounter a difficulty. The usual method for defining a Boolean com-
pletion is to find a separative partial order equivalent to P for forcing (known as the
separative quotient), and embed it into a Boolean algebra49. Effectively, we add a
bottom element and the required suprema to form BpPq.50
In the present context, however, it is unclear that this can always be done. Since
the partial order always goes to the ‘top’ of V , one can not always assume that there
will be space to add a bottom element and suprema. This is not to say that it is
impossible to provide a Boolean completion for class forcings; as it turns out a class
partial order has a class Boolean-completion in a model of MK precisely when all
antichains are at most set-sized (known as the Ord-chain condition).51 This does
show, however, that the kinds of class forcings one can interpret using this technique
are rather restricted.
However, putting aside the questions of scope here, we note that even for the
forcings that can be interpreted this way, the Naturalness Constraints are left some-
what neglected. This is for similar reasons to the forcing relation. Though the ap-
proach is now somewhat model-theoretic, the two-valued aspect of the set theo-
rist’s reasoning is missed. When we reason with V rGs it ‘looks-like’ we reason with
a standard set-theoretic model, and the Boolean valued model V B does not have
this flavour—rather it looks like we reason with Boolean-valued ‘probabilistic’ sets
(since, one can informally think of a Boolean-valued model V B as assigning ‘proba-
bilities’ from B to membership and equality). Moreover, again no model is actually
extended in considering these constructions. To accord more fully with the Natural-
ness Constraints, we need a two-valued model that looks a lot like V , and also gets
extended in the relevant construction.
3.3 Boolean ultrapowers and quotient structures
There are, however, ways of modifying Boolean-valued models to proper-class-sized
two-valued structures. We provide an informal description of the technique to high-
light philosophical issues, but it is developed in detail in [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012]
(and referred to in Hamkins’ paper on the multiverse [Hamkins, 2012]). Importantly,
the method provides a way of finding models internal to V that bear forcing rela-
tionships to one another. This is done by first taking an ultrafilter U on the relevant
49More formally, for any set-sized partial order P, there is a Boolean algebra BpPq and an embedding
e : P ÝÑ BpPq` (where BpPq` is the set of non-zero elements of BpPq) such that for p, q P P: (i) if p ďP q,
then eppq ďBpPq epqq, (ii) p and q are compatible iff eppq ^ epqq, and (iii) teppq|p P Pu is dense in BpPq.
50For the full details, see [Jech, 2002], Chapter 14.
51See [Holy et al., 2017] for the result.
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Boolean-algebra B (for convenience sake, we now drop the notation BpPq) and con-
structing a particular ultrapower embedding jU (the so-called Boolean ultrapower
map) between V and an inner model VˇU . When we then form the quotient structure
V B{U of V B (formed by taking the standard quotient structure), we find an interest-
ing relationship between VˇU and V B{U : V B{U is precisely the forcing extension of
VˇU by U . One can verify that V B{U |ù ZFC and also that if φ has Boolean-value
greater than 0B in V B, then V B{U |ù φ. In more formal terms, one can prove:
Theorem 13. [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012] The Naturalist Account of Forcing. If V is
the universe of set theory and B is a notion of forcing, then there is in V a definable
class model of the theory expressing what it means to be a forcing extension of V .
Specifically, in the forcing language with P, constant symbols xˇ for every x P V , a
predicate symbol Vˇ to represent V as a ground model, and a constant symbol G˚, the
theory asserts:
(1) The full elementary diagram of V , relativised to the predicate Vˇ , using the con-
stant symbols for elements of V .
(2) The assertion that Vˇ is a transitive proper class in the (new) universe.
(3) The assertion that G˚ is a Vˇ -generic ultrafilter on Bˇ.
(4) The assertion that the new universe is Vˇ rG˚s, and ZFC holds there.
Importantly, there is no need for the ultrafilter to be V -generic here, and hence U
can perfectly well be in V . In fact, when one constructs the Boolean ultrapower over
some model of set theory M “ pM ,Eq, the claim that U is M-generic is equivalent to
the Boolean ultrapower jU being trivial (i.e. letting EU be the ‘membership’ relation
defined by the Boolean ultrapower, jU is an isomorphism betweenM and pMˇU ,EU q).
In the case where jU is non-trivial on V , we map V to a subclass of itself (much as
we do with a measurable cardinal embedding). Since VˇU is not the whole of V when
U is in V (and hence not V -generic), it is possible for a set external to VˇU to be our
generic for VˇU . Our interpretation of forcing might then be as follows. We note that
VˇU , whilst not isomorphic to V , nonetheless looks a lot like V ; it is a proper-class-
sized elementary extension of V . Instead of using the Boolean-valued model V B
(with its attendant difficulties regarding classicality and combinatorial properties),
we could interpret our use of the term ‘V ’ and ‘V rGs’ as VˇU and V B{U respectively.
We would then perform far better with respect to the earlier outline Naturalness
Constraints, we have a two-valued structures, both proper-class sized, and there is
actual model-theoretic extension of these structures occurring.
There are, however, several problems with this approach. We should first note
that the use of Boolean ultrapowers and quotient structures suffers from the same
problem of scope as the Boolean-valued model approach—since it depends on find-
ing Boolean completions we will not be able to use the method for certain kinds of
class forcing. We have, however, moved to an interpretation on which the reasoning
is both two-valued and combinatorial, and on which a model very similar to V is
extended.
However, this construction can often come at the price of well-foundedness. Ob-
serve that if the Boolean ultrapower map is to be well-founded, it must elementarily
embed V into an inner model thereof, and hence must have a critical point κ that is
measurable. More precisely:
Theorem 14. [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012] If U is an ultrafilter in V on the complete
Boolean algebra B, then the following are equivalent:
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(1) VˇU is well-founded.
(2) VˇU is an ω-model (i.e. has the standard natural numbers).
(3) U meets all countable maximal antichains of B in V .
(4) U is countably complete over V (i.e. if xan|n ă ωy P V is an ω-sequence of an P U ,
then ^nan P U ).
(5) U is weakly countably complete over V (i.e. if xan|n ă ωy P V is an ω-sequence
of an P U , then ^nan ­“ H).
By (4), for the Boolean ultrapower to remain well-founded, we need significant
large cardinal properties attaching to the completeness of the ultrafilter U .52 Recall
that many of the generic embeddings we wished to talk about had very small critical
points. We are now in a position to mention the following:
Fact 15. Let U be an ultrafilter on a complete Boolean algebra B P V , and assume
that VˇU is well-founded with jU such that critpjU q “ κ. Then VˇU cannot be used to
interpret forcing constructions that change the structure of sets below Vκ.53
The key philosophical consequence of this fact is that if we are to interpret a forc-
ing construction that involves the structure of sets below a measurable cardinal, then
the Boolean ultrapower cannot be well-founded. This creates serious problems with
respect to the Naturalness Constraints; in virtue of our adherence to the iterative
conception, one might think that well-foundedness is an especially important condi-
tion on structures conforming to our concept of set and qualifying as intended. But
the above feature of the Boolean ultrapower violates this for many of our favourite
forcing constructions. One cannot even add a single Cohen real without the Boolean
ultrapower being non-well-founded. Moreover, we noted earlier that one of the key
strengths of generic embeddings was to study ‘small’ accessible cardinals through
the lens of large-cardinal-like embeddings. But, if we wish to move ω1 using a
generic embedding, then any Boolean ultrapower construction interpreting the re-
quired forcing will have differences in relatively ‘small’ levels’ (e.g. V VˇUω1`2 and V
V B{U
ω1`2
will have different sets as ωVˇU1 is countable in V
B{U ). By the previous fact, there
cannot be any difference in these levels without VˇU becoming non-well-founded; a
severe philosophical limitation when we consider how a set theorist conceives of V
and M as interellated well-founded structures in V rGs. Philosophically, this feature
of forcing is especially important—it keeps the models well-founded and the resulting
model also therefore conforms to the iterative conception of set; admitting an ab-
solute notion of construction via transfinite iteration of a powerset-like operation.54
52The existence of a countably complete non-principal ultrafilter is equivalent to the existence of a mea-
surable cardinal.
53
Proof. It is a basic fact concerning measurable cardinals that if κ is measurable and the critical point of
some j, then j preserves Vκ. (This is because if jU did not, there would be (per impossibile) a different
critical point below κ—see for example [Schindler, 2014], p. 51.) In the case where jU is well-founded,
since κ is the critical point of jU we know that jU preserves Vκ. Thus one cannot add subsets below
Vκ.
54Plausibly, this is a reason why the independence phenomenon has gained more traction in set the-
ory than in arithmetic; the arithmetic sentences we know of that are independent are require very non-
standard models to witness the independence.
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This philosophical problem has a technical manifestation: While we can still trace re-
sults derived from the study of these embeddings back through jU to V , our reason-
ing in the embedded model will be severely limited. Since the non-well-foundedness
of the models implies a high degree of non-absoluteness (the satisfaction predicate
itself is not even absolute55), we cannot simply use many of our normal assump-
tions regarding the relationship of sets in V to those in VˇU and V B{U . For example,
consider the following reasoning template (stated in naive forcing-language):
Example 16. Extend V with a genericG that adds subsets above the least measurable
κ to form V rGs. Now extend V rGswith a generic H adding subsets below κ to form
V rGsrHs. Show that V rGsrHs satisfies some ∆1-formula φ, and hence infer (by the
absoluteness of ∆1 formulas for transtive models) that V satisfies φ.
How would this be interpreted using the Boolean ultrapower? Letting B be the
Boolean algebra for G, and UG be the relevant ultrafilter, it is at least have possible
that ‘V rGs’ can be interpreted as some well-founded inner model V B{UG, extending
VˇUG . Letting C be the Boolean algebra corresponding to H , jUGpCq be the image of
C under jUG , and UH the corresponding ultrafilter on jUGpCq, we would then em-
bed V B{UG into ­pV B{UGqUH , with forcing extension pV B{UGqjUG pCq{UH . But now,
while we would know that pV B{UGqjUG pCq{UH |ù φ, it would also be a non-well-
founded structure, and so we cannot use the absoluteness and ∆1 nature of φ to infer
φ holds of VˇUG (from where we could infer that φ holds of V either by absolute-
ness or pulling back along jUG ). Rather we have to slowly and carefully trace where
each embedding takes us, what is satisfied where, and the nature of the models in-
volved. Specifically, since pV B{UGqjUG pCq{UH |ù φ, we know by absoluteness there
that ­pV B{UGqUH |ù φ (since the two models are transitive relative to each other).
Pulling back along jUH , we then have that V
B{UG |ù φ, and hence by absoluteness
VˇUG |ù φ. (We can then pull back again or just use absoluteness to obtain V |ù φ.) The
fact that the models are radically different in nature means that we have to be care-
ful where we apply absoluteness, making sure that we pull back along the Boolean
ultrapower before applying absoluteness to ensure no illegitimate uses of the abso-
luteness of ∆1-formulas. In the ‘naive’ reasoning, we just inferred from the fact that
forcing keeps the models standard and V rGsrHs |ù φ that V |ù φ.
The philosophical point here is just the following; sometimes one might want to
reason about V as though it were in a multiverse framework, but the moves made
sometimes depend upon the nature of forcing with respect to V . The fact that the
Boolean ultrapower can fail to keep the models standard can result in many extra-
steps needing to be made (rather than the single one required to interpret the forc-
ing), and so represents a severe deformation of the set-theorist’s intuitive thought.
It seems then, that though the use of Boolean ultrapowers and quotient structures
provides a way of modifying Boolean-valued structures into a two-valued frame-
work, the price can be high, presenting difficulties of both a technical and philo-
sophical character. Interestingly, this opens a new area of enquiry; examine the cases
where forcing and large cardinals combine to keep the ultrapower well-founded.56
In these cases, the Boolean ultrapower fares excellently as an interpretation of forcing,
suggesting that there are an especially ‘natural’ class of forcing constructions for the
Universist. However, as a general technique for interpreting forcing constructions
55For details, see [Hamkins and Yang, 2013]. To give an example of just how extreme the phenomenon
is, one can have two models that have the same objects as natural numbers, but disagree about whether a
particular (non-standard) n is odd or even.
56See [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012] for discussion.
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within a Universist framework, the technique falls short.57
3.4 Countable transitive models
Examining the Naturalness Constraints, we can see that given that (i) we actually
want a model to be extended in a forcing-like way, (ii) these models should be two-
valued, and (iii) we would like the relevant models to satisfy as much as possible
of the theory of V , the strategy of interpreting forcing constructions via the use of a
Boolean ultrapower got a lot right. It suffered two problems, however; one of scope
(interpreting class-sized Boolean algebras) and one of how the ultrapower behaved
with respect to ‘small’ sets. This is what we’ll try to remedy by analysing how we
might use countable transitive models in interpreting forcing. As we’ll see, there
are several respects in which the countable transitive model strategy performs better
with respect to the Naturalness Constraints, but nonetheless this comes at a price
(specifically concerning uncountable sets). We’ll conclude that the countable transi-
tive model strategy represents an (if not the most) attractive way of interpreting forc-
ing using the symbol ‘V ’, however for certain applications the Boolean-ultrapower
strategy is especially natural.
The countable transitive model strategy comes in several forms. Initially, the
method was designed to deal with the apparently problematic metamathematics of
forcing from within ZFC. Given a desired relative consistency proof of some sen-
tence φ, we assume that φ (respectively  φ) is provable from ZFC. Since proofs are
finite, we then know (by the Reflection, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, and Mostowski Col-
lapse theorems) that there is a countable transitive model satisfying φ, and further-
more this countable transitive model can be arranged so as to have enough structure
to enable forcing. Since the model is countable, we know that generics are avail-
able,58 and can force to obtain  φ (whilst preserving the relevant fragment of ZFC),
contradicting the claim that (the relevant fragment of) ZFC proves φ.59
57A side remark should be made here about previous philosophical discussion concerning the Boolean
ultrapower. Hamkins takes the Boolean ultrapower to show that the Universist can simulate forcing within
her framework, and so should be moved to accept the existence of forcing extensions intuitively under-
stood, and hence the falsity of her position. Koellner provides a response along the lines some of our
observations here:
“There are three important things to note about [V B{U ]—it need not be transitive, it need
not be well-founded, it is a definable class in V . For all three reasons it is as non-standard a
model of set theory...one sees by construction that the model produced is not of the appro-
priate type to count as the universe of sets.” ([Koellner, 2013], pp. 19–20)
Our point is just the following: Even if the Universist should (plainly) assert that neither VˇU nor V B{U
is the universe of sets, it can sometimes provide a very close simulation of forcing claims. Hamkins takes
this to show that the Universist is wrong. We push this in the other direction: It shows that the Universist
can sometimes capture much of the insight that is meant to be an advantage of the forcing multiversist’s
position.
58Assuming, of course, that V is uncountable.
59Formally, there are two main ways of executing the strategy (see [Kunen, 2013], IV.5.1 for details):
Suppose that we wish to prove that some statement φ is independent from ZFC. We then suppose that
φ (or  φ) has a proof in ZFC (from now on we only consider the case where we wish to show that  φ
is unprovable). If  φ were provable, we would have ZFC` φ $ 0 “ 1. Since proofs are finite, we then
know that this proof would only use a finite set of axioms of ZFC (let it be denoted by ‘Γ’). We then
know (by the forcing method) that given such a Γ, there is a larger finite set of axioms of ZFC (let it be
denoted by ‘Λ’) such that ZFC proves the conditional:
“If there is countable transitive model for Λ, then there is a countable transitive model for
Γ` φ.”
However, now we can use the Reflection Theorem, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Mostowski Col-
lapse Lemma to then obtain a countable transitive model N for Λ, and hence have a countable transitive
model for Γ` φ, contradicting our supposition that Γ` φ $ 0 “ 1.
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Such methods are fine as far as they go. For the purpose of allowing us to anal-
yse forcing arguments establishing relative consistency proofs from within ZFC the
technique performs adequately; any inconsistency of φ with ZFC could be traced to
a countable model, and the relevant forcing argument shows that there is no such
inconsistency (on the assumption that ZFC itself is consistent).
However, while V presumably satisfies ZFC and its finite fragmets for the Uni-
versist, there is no guarantee that a given countable transitive model of (a fragment
of) ZFC represents V with respect to first-order truth in general. While we can, for
any appropriate given finite set Γ of sentences satisfied by V , assume that there is a
countable transitive model M satisfying Γ, V can (and indeed will) satisfy sentences
beyond those in Γ, and there may be sentences such that V |ù φ and M |ù  φ. In
order then to mimic the behaviour of V as closely as possible (and in line with the
Naturalness Constraints) we would like a countable transitive model M that resem-
bles V sufficiently well to allow us to interpret forcing over V as closely as possible.
This can be achieved by assuming that there is a countable transitive model ele-
mentarily equivalent to V for first-order truth (we will denote such a model with the
letter ‘V’).60 We can then interpret any forcing over this model, formulating axioms
and proving theorems concerning V (over which generics abound) and then, by the
elementary equivalence, exporting the relevant consequences back to V proper.
For example, if we wish to formulate an axiom that uses an extension (say a
generic embedding), we simply formulate it as concerned with V (where extensions
are uncontroversially available) and then know that any first-order consequence of
the axiom true in V is also true of V . If an ideal of the required kind I exists in V ,
then we will have a corresponding object I 1 P V, and then there will be the required
embedding i1 : V ÝÑM Ď VrGs.
This strategy seems to resolve some of the problems of our previously considered
accounts. First, regarding class forcing, we remarked earlier that we would like to in-
terpret class forcings that lack a definable forcing relation, do not necessarily satisfy
ZFC, or add classes but not sets. All these can be easily interpreted for V: Letting
V “ pV, Pq, we can consider models of the form V1 “ pV, P, CVq, where CV is some
countable collection of classes for V. We can then perfectly well consider extensions
that add classes to CV without adding sets to V, and/or ones in which the the forcing
relation is not definable over V, and first-order consequences61 thereby derived in V
can be transferred back to V . Similarly, since V is very small by the standards of V ,
there is no obstacle to defining meaningful notions of Boolean completions for class
Alternatively, we could expandLP toLP,C,F by two constant symbols C and F . We then add axioms
to ZFC as follows (for this specific approach, see [Shoenfield, 1967] as well as [Kunen, 2013]):
Definition 17. ZFC˚ is a system inLP,C,F with the following axioms:
1. ZFC
2. C is a transitive set.
3. F is a bijection from ω onto C.
4. φC for every axiom φ of ZFC (note that, by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem, this is an
axiom scheme).
We know (by the Reflection Theorem, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Mostowski Collapse Lemma)
that ZFC˚ is a conservative extension of ZFC. We can then treat C as our countable transitive model,
and conduct our construction there.
60Uses of this idea for developing axioms have been explored by Friedman and collaborators in
[Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013], [Antos et al., 2015], and [Friedman, F].
61In this paper we restrict only to first-order consequences. Salient here is that the use of countable
transitive models can also be applied to higher-order axioms that use extensions (such as those mentioned
in [Friedman, F]).
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forcings over V (though they might not be in V), since we can use the resources in V
external to V. Moreover, since generics are freely available over V one does not need
the Boolean algebras to interpret the forcing (though their study might nonetheless
carry mathematical interest).
It seems then that the countable transitive model strategy is at least flexible con-
cerning interpretation of forcing, providing a uniform way of interpreting the con-
structions. But how does it fare with respect to the Naturalness Constraints? Here, it
also has a number of pleasing philosophical features. V in many ways very closely
resembles V ; it is a two-valued structure that satisfies the same first-order sentences
as V and (in contrast with certain applications of the Boolean ultrapower) is really a
well-founded structure (and so forms a genuine cumulative hierarchy). In this way,
V provides a miniature ‘picture’ of V inside V , one which can be freely reasoned
about using extensions. Moreover, once we have interpreted ‘V ’ as ‘V’ in a forcing
construction, interpretation is completely transparent; V really is extended by some
G to form VrGs, and VrGs has all the properties we would expect it to have: It is a
well-founded cumulative hierarchy obtained from V by forcing with G.
There are some drawbacks concerning the Naturalness Constraints, however.
Unlike the Boolean ultrapower, V cannot contain all the ordinals or uncountable
sets. We think that preservation of well-foundedness is preferable to containing un-
countable sets. This is in part for philosophical reasons; a well-founded model is
one that is obtained by admitting a genuine powerset-like operation transfinitely,
and thus comes close to the iterative conception in an absolute sense. A non-well-
founded model, even one containing uncountable sets, only has Vα internally (since
the model will still satisfy the theorem of ZFC that every set belongs to some Vα),
but actually admits of a descending membership sequence and so cannot be said to
come close to satisfying the iterative conception in any absolute sense. To our mind,
having an absolute notion of the iterative conception should be privileged over the
existence of actual uncountable sets—the former concerns the fundamentals of our
contemporary conception of set whereas the latter is a result of our conception of
set (as evidence for this, consider the fact that we call the Axiom of Foundation an
axiom, whereas Cantor’s Theorem is called a theorem).62 We might thus feel that it is
more important for the former to be satisfied in an absolute manner than the latter (it
is more important that our model actually be a well-founded cumulative hierarchy
than actually contain uncountable sets). Moreover, a well-founded model (even a
countable one) can have (a subclass of) real membership as its membership relation,
whereas a non-well-founded model cannot. Other reasons are more technical; as we
noted earlier (when considering repeated applications of forcing to form V rGsrHs,
absoluteness inferences concerning ∆1-formulas, and the Boolean ultrapower) one
of the salient features of forcing is that it keeps the relevant model standard relative
to the ground model. In the context of the use of countable transitive models then,
repeated applications of forcing will always keep the model well-behaved with re-
spect to the iterative conception (and subsequent uses of absoluteness), whereas this
is not the case when the possibility of non-well-foundedness is introduced (as we
saw with the abstract example of V rGsrHs earlier).
We thus arrive at the following picture; the Boolean ultrapower is especially nat-
ural when one can keep it well-founded. However, the countable transitive model
strategy performs reasonably well (given the iterative conception) across the board.
We suggest then that whilst the Boolean-ultrapower provides interesting questions
for exploring Universism and forcing, if a uniform interpretation of forcing is de-
62[Koellner, 2014], §1.4.1 makes a similar point concerning a different theorem (The Hydra Theorem)
and axiom (that 0 is well-ordered).
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sired, the countable transitive model strategy fares better.
Countable transitive models and Universism
Thus far, we have argued that a modification of the countable transitive model strat-
egy is reasonably philosophically virtuous, at least as far as the Naturalness Con-
straints are concerned. We are not done yet, however. Critics of Universism (such
as [Hamkins, 2012]) are well aware of the possibility of both a countable transitive
model of ZFC, and well as one elementarily equivalent to V .63 Hamkins has two
main objections against the use of countable transitive models (especially with re-
gards to forcing constructions).
First, he complains that the countable transitive model strategy is not broad
enough, since it only accounts for forcing over certain models of set theory, whereas
other methods (such as the Boolean ultrapower) can interpret (set) forcing over any
model.64
Hamkins’ second complaint surrounds the metamathematical commitments of
the theorist endorsing the countable transitive model strategy. In order to interpret
forcing over a countable transitive model, Hamkins argues, we have to assume the
existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC. But this takes us somewhat be-
yond the consistency strength of our canonical set theory (i.e. ZFC); in fact the
existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC implies the consistency of the-
ories obtained by transfinite iterations of the consistency operator (so ConpZFCq,
ConpConpZFCqq, and so on transfinitely). In this way, he argues, the Universist
is forced to pay a metamathematical tax in implementing the countable transitive
model strategy.65
We find each of Hamkins’ objections unconvincing from the Universist’s per-
spective. Concerning the scope of the countable transitive model strategy: Whilst
Hamkins is, as a matter of mathematical fact, correct that if we interpret width-
extending constructions as concerned with countable transitive models, our inter-
pretation of extensions will not apply to arbitrary models, in the present context this
does not motivate the claim that insight might be missed. In particular, if we slowly
work through the dialectic, we see that the main difficulties we noted were (i) to
provide an interpretation of of axioms mentioning extensions, (ii) to explain why
63For the former claim see [Hamkins, 2012], and for the latter claim [Hamkins, 2003].
64See for example, the following remarks:
“There are a number of drawbacks, however, to the countable transitive ground model
approach to forcing. The first drawback is that it provides an understanding of forcing
over only some models of set theory, whereas other accounts of forcing allow one to make
sense of forcing over any model of set theory. With the countable transitive model approach
to forcing, for example, the question “Is φ forceable?” appears sensible only when asked
in connection with a countable transitive model M , and this is an impoverishment of the
method.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p421)
65For example, Hamkins argues as follows:
“A second drawback concerns metamathematical issues surrounding the existence of
countable transitive models of ZFC: the basic problem is that we cannot prove that there
are any such models, because by Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, if ZFC is consistent
then it cannot prove that there are any models of ZFC at all. Even if we were to assume
ConpZFCq, then we still can’t prove that there is a transitive model of ZFC, since the ex-
istence of such a model implies ConpZFC`ConpZFCqq, and the consistency of this, and
so on transfinitely...As a result, this approach to forcing seems to require one to pay a sort
of tax just to implement the forcing method, starting with a stronger hypothesis than one
ends up with just in order to carry out the argument.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p421)
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theorems making use of extensions were acceptable for proving facts about V , and
do so (iii) in a way that accounts for the majority of our intuitive thinking concerning
extensions. For these purposes, the countable transitive model strategy is reasonably
satisfactory as it stands. It is uncontroversial for a Universist that some models can-
not literally be extended in width, indeed it is part of their view that width extension
is impossible for some models (such as V or one of its initial segments). Whilst
it is true that certain constructions (such as use of the forcing relation or Boolean
ultrapower map) permit intrepretation of forcing extensions where ‘V ’ denotes V ,
some uncountable class, or possibly even a non-well-founded structure, we deny
that this represents an impoverishment of the countable transitive model strategy.
Those techniques are always available in cases where the countable transitive model
does not apply (such as in the case of a non-well-founded proper class structure).
We do not wish to argue that the countable transitive model strategy is superior in
every case, rather we wish to analyse what is possible given the Naturalness Con-
straints and argue that the countable transitive model strategy is better for inter-
preting a certain class of extensions (namely when we wish to talk about V using
well-founded and transitive extensions). Our point is just that if we are concerned
with V , the countable transitive model strategy provides a way of interpreting this
practice in line with the Naturalness Constraints. Thus, unless the Universist is par-
ticularly wedded to the existence of uncountable sets in her interpretation of forcing,
Hamkins’ complaint fails to gain dialectic traction.
These points do nothing to assuage Hamkins’ second worry, however. There is
still the charge that the Universist pays a problematic metamathematical tax. Of
course, one blunt response would be to say that the tax is worth it, so it should be
paid. We wish to see if we can do better, however.
There are at least two ways in which we might take the Universist to have to pay
a tax she would rather not. The first is a formal one: it might be the case that she must
use assumptions of greater strength than ZFC in executing the strategy. Second, she
might be paying an ontological tax, in that she has to commit herself to the existence
of objects to which she would rather not.
Regarding the formal tax, Hamkins is correct that baldly asserting the existence
of a countable transitive model of ZFC (of which presumably V is one) implies
ConpZFCq, ConpConpZFCqq, and so on, transfinitely. A response here is quick,
however. The extent to which we move beyond ZFC is very dependent upon how
we formulate the axiom. If we write:
Axiom 18. There exists a countable transitive model V such that V |ù ZFC.
we would indeed go beyond ZFC. Indeed, adding a constraint that V satisfies all
the same sentences as V would yield a contradiction by Tarski’s Theorem on the un-
definability of truth. We could instead formulate the axiom that there is a Vα which
is Σω-elementary in V ; a very slight extension of the provable Le´vy Reflection Prin-
ciple, and then Skolemise over Vα. Much like the assumption of a transitive model of
ZFC this assumption is very weak (well below an inaccessible). However, we can do
even better formally. We can formulate the claim that there is a countable transtive
model elementarily equivalent to V via the use of the following axiom scheme (as
noticed by [Feferman, 1969]):
Definition 19. LetLP,V¯ be the languageLP augmented with a single constant sym-
bol V¯. ZFCV¯ is then a theory inLP,V¯ with the following axioms:
(i) ZFC
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(ii) V¯ is countable and transitive.
(iii) For every φ inLP, φØ φV¯ (by Tarski’s Theorem, this is an axiom scheme).
By replicating the proof of the Reflection Theorem for ZFCV¯, we know that
ZFCV is a conservative extension of ZFC.66,67 However, V then satisfies exactly the
same parameter-free first-order sentences of ZFC as V . When conducting a forcing
proof in ZFC (or some extension thereof), we can use the usual trick of reflecting a
finite set of axioms, but without loss of generality assume that they are reflected to V
to ensure enough similarity to V and conformity with the Naturalness Constraints.
Whilst we can only see from the metatheory (without a non-conservative extension
of ZFC) that V is a countable transitive model elementarily equivalent the V , this is
to be expected: V cannot have access to its own truth definition. Moreover, the Uni-
versist is no stranger to accepting the use of metatheoretical talk in her set-theoretic
reasoning (for example: “V |ù ZFC”).
So it seems that we need not pay a significant formal price when interpreting
width extensions with countable transitive models. It remains to be seen that the
Universist need not pay an ontological price. To what extent does the existence of
a countable transitive model elementarily equivalent to V represent a substantial
ontological presupposition for the Universist? We shall argue that the Universist
already has good reasons to accept the existence of such a model given her commit-
ment to the existence of a unqiue and maximal proper class model of set theory. We
shall pursue two strategies here: (1) examining Skolem functions in the Universist’s
metatheory, and (2) the use of a truth predicate.
For (1) we start by examining an informal argument of Cohen68 for the existence
of a countable transitive model of ZF:
“The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem allows us to pass to countable sub-
models of a given model. Now, the “universe” does not form a set and so
we cannot, in ZF, prove the existence of a countable sub-model. How-
ever, informally we can repeat the proof of the theorem. We recall that
the proof merely consisted of choosing successively sets which satisfied
certain properties, if such a set existed. In ZF we can do this process
finitely often. There is no reason to believe that in the real world this
process cannot be done countably many times and thus yield a countable
standard model for ZF.” ([Cohen, 1966], p79)
While Cohen is primarily interested in the existence of a countable transitive
model for ZF, we can import his argument to the case of V as follows. When consid-
ering finite subsets Γ of sentences inLP satisfied by V we move to a countable tran-
sitive model of Γ by using the Reflection Theorem to find a Vα |ù Γ. We then use AC
66Proof Sketch. Begin by replicating the usual proof of the Reflection Theorem for ZFCV¯. Suppose then
that φ P LP and ZFCV¯ $ φ. Then there is a finite set of axioms Γ of ZFCV¯, such that Γ $ φ. Let ψ be
the conjunction of all axioms of ZFCV¯ in Γ containing V¯, and χ be conjunction of all axioms of ZFCV¯
in Γ not containing V¯. Without loss of generality, we may then assume that Γ “ tψ,χu. ψ is then a
sentence which states that there is a countable transitive model of some finite list of ZFC axioms Λ, and
χ is a finite part ofZFC. SinceZFC already proves that there is a countable transtive model for Λ (by the
Reflection Theorem and Mostowski Collapse Lemma in ZFC), and hence proves χ ^ pDMqM |ù Λ, we
have ZFC $ φ. Many thanks to [names removed for blind review] for pointing out to me this theorem
of Feferman, and for discussion of the proof.
67It is interesting to note that [Hamkins, 2003] discusses this formulation in depth, and is well aware of
the conservativity result. It is perhaps the metatheoretical character of the claim that V satisfies ZFC that
explains the absence of this strategy when considering countable transitive models in [Hamkins, 2012].
68Similar arguments (from a non-Universist perspective) are available in
[Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013].
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to find a set of functions FVα such that for every existential statement Dxφpxq true in
Vα, there is an fφ P F that picks a single witness a such that φpaq holds. We then form
a countable M |ù Γ. Since the relation (i.e. P) on Vα is extensional, well-founded, and
set-like, so is the relation on M, and we then use the Mostowski Collapse Lemma to
collapse to obtain a countable transitive model M1 |ù Γ. Turning now to V , we sim-
ply note that V is one model of ZFC among many. Thus, we can posit the existence
of a set of Skolem functions FV for V (by ‘choosing69’ a witness for the countably
many existential statements satisfied by V with a countable sequence of choices).
Then, by Skolemising and Collapsing, we obtain a countable transitive model V that
satisfies exactly the same parameter-free first-order sentences as V . The main issue
here is that, by Tarski’s Theorem on the undefinability of truth, that while V can see
FV , it does not know that FV provides its own set of Skolem-functions. Thus, by
adopting this informal and metatheoretic version of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem,
we justify the existence of a countable transitive model for V . Again, we note that
the Universist should not be bothered by making these various metatheoretic claims
in virtue of the things she wants to say already concerning her own view.
Though the Cohen-style argument depends on only mild metatheoretic assump-
tions (the possibility of transferring a countable sequence of choices in the metalan-
guage to the existence of Skolem functions in V ), it nonetheless depends upon a
certain amount of combinatorial reasoning outside the object language. We might,
therefore, find a more logical approach desirable. Here we find a role for the use
of a truth predicate. We begin by noting that the Universist already makes claims
concerning first-order parameter-free truth in V . For example:
Example 20. “In V every sentence is either true or false.”
Example 21. “Every axiom of ZFC is true in V .”
Given that she would like some formal apparatus for talking about her own view,
it is natural for her to countenance the existence of a truth predicate for talking about
her own view (otherwise she ends up baldly stating the sentences in question, rather
than the truth thereof). We therefore make the following:70
Definition 22. Let ZFCTr be the result of adding to ZFC a truth-predicate Tr for
first-order parameter-free truth, such that Trpxφyq holds iff V |ù φ, adding the Tarski-
biconditionals, and permitting the use of Tr in the Comprehension and Replacement
schema.
Such a theory represents a very minimal formalisation of the first-level of typed
truth over V for the Universist. We now mention the following:
Fact 23. ZFCTr proves that there is a countable transitive model elementarily equiv-
alent to V for first-order parameter-free truth in ZFC.71
Thus, if we permit the addition of a truth predicate for V to ZFC, the use of
which a Universist may well accept (given the other presuppositions of her view),
69As Cohen notes, this is not possible in ZFpCq by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
70I am grateful to [name removed for blind review] for technical discussion concerning the use of truth
predicates and countable transitive models.
71
Proof. (Sketch) Begin by proving the Reflection Theorem for ZFCTr . Then, reflect on the formula “xφy
is a Go¨del code of a formula and Trpxφyq” to obtain a Vα elementarily equivalent to V (since for a given
natural number n “ xφy, V |ù Trpxφyq iff Vα |ù Trpxφyq, and hence V |ù φ iff Vα |ù φ). Then Skolemise
and Collapse over Vα to get the desired countable transtive model.
27
we obtain a countable transitive model elementarily equivalent to V . This argument,
in combination with the informal use of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, shows
that the existence of a countable transitive model elementarily equivalent to V is
little ontological price to pay, if any.
Conclusion
We have seen that Universist has some reason to want to use forcing to prove theo-
rems and formulate axioms about V . Whilst the use of a Boolean ultrapower some-
times results in non-well-founded models, it suggests a class of forcings of special
interest for the Universist; those for which the Boolean ultrapower can be kept well-
founded, and thus she has a particularly natural interpretation of forcing. The count-
able transitive model strategy, augmented to yield a model elementarily equivalent
to V , we found to be an effective, flexible, and well-motivated method for interpret-
ing forcing constructions. The extent to which one thinks that Hamkins’ complaints
have dialectic force against the Universist, thus turns precisely on whether or not one
thinks that the Universist must incorporate actually uncountable sets in her interpre-
tation of forcing. Perhaps such an argument can be made, but for now the Universist
should remain largely unfazed by criticisms stemming from forcing constructions.
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